Showing 1 - 10 of 30
"We show that when leaders share some of their information with subordinates, decision making is subject to a motivational bias; leaders make the decisions their subordinates want to see. As this bias increases with the quality of the shared information, an improvement of an organization's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005261456
We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members choose a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643603
We use a mechanism–design approach to study a team whose members choose a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade–off between adaptation and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071245
Washington's "revolving door"––the movement from government service into the lobbying industry––is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011129968
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be indifferent to the concerns of the electorate and, as a result, potentially lacking in discipline but unlikely to pander to public opinion. We investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126009
We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance. The setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where, for exogenous reasons, management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990464
Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen estimate the value of political connections in Washington
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416243
We explore the forces that determine rulings and citations within a court. Our model predicts: (1) that the presence of a social interaction between a judicial panel i and the authors of a prior judgement j increases the probability that i reaches the same decision as j and that i cites j as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010683419
Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be insulated from political pressure and, as a result, indifferent to the concerns of the electorate. We investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and 2005....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574368
Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry - is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745205