This paper discusses the behavior of some well-known solutions to standard bargaining problems on the basis of solidarity-type axioms. The paper provides alternative axiomatizations of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown tobe non-implementable where all...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with artially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification—<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$s$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving...</equationsource></inlineequation>

Three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims are provided. Two new contraction-type and expansion-type axioms are used. Moreover, the single-valuedness axiom is dispensable if the classical symmetry axiom is...