Purpose – Interview data is often the cornerstone of qualitative field studies, yet problems with getting sufficient, rich, reliable data in a cost effective manner can inhibit the progress of field study research. The purpose of this paper is to describe the use of a novel interview method,...

Building on Romano's analysis of the U.S. securities regulatory regime, we model competition between professional auditing associations. We show that such competition is an effective substitute for government regulation, providing an efficient means for auditors to signal their service quality....

This study is motivated by the apparent reluctance of Australian urban water entities to adopt the user pays pricing formula despite strong encouragement by Australian Governments to do so. Elements of contingency theory, political cost theory and transaction cost economics are employed in...

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to test whether dominant shareholder(s) of a firm enhance performance in Bangladesh and thus examines the arbitrary moves by the regulatory bodies, in the name of promoting 'good corporate governance', to restrict ownership...

This paper investigates the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality after the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in 2001. Using 1625 firm-year observations during the period 2003-2007, we tested whether corporate governance variables are...

This paper examines the effect of auditor tenure and provision of non-audit services on earnings conservatism. Following Basu (1997), we measure earnings conservatism by using the asymmetric timeliness of earnings model and the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition model. Using a...

This paper investigates whether firm corporate governance practices have an effect on the quality of its publicly released financial information. Researchers carrying out earnings quality research usually relies on Dechow and Dichev (2002), Leuz et al (2003), Penman (2001) or Barton and Simko...