PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors' welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepot, a PTA without concessions to the outsider will hurt the outsider's welfare...

PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors’ welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepot, a PTA without concessions to the outsider will hurt the outsider’s...

This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a...

The case is studied where several small countries, wanting to set second-best tariffs to maximize objective functions, move from the situation where they can set their most appropriate tariffs to the situation where they form a customs union. By dividing the overall effect of forming customs...

This paper develops three bodies of analysis. First, I examine the bilateral estimation of income yields from financial assets in 10 OECD countries. There are three kinds of assets: debt, portfolio equity, and FDI. I found that Finland, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. have large advantages of...