We study two platforms competing for members by investing in network quality.  Quality is complementary to the network size: the marginal utility generated by an additional member increases with the network's quality.  Platforms are imperfect substitutes: a share of the potential members are...

We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms, but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms. A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) or corruption (moral...

In a model of horizontal matching on the labor market, we show that increasing workers’ bargaining power may increase some employers’ incentive to switch to new production activities. In particular, this could lead to (i) higher wages, (ii) more jobs, (iii) better jobs and (iv) higher...

In a model of horizontal matching on the labor market, we show that increasing the bargainingpower of workers may increase the incentive of some employers to switch to newproduction activities. In particular, this could lead to (i) higher wages, (ii) more jobs, (iii)better jobs and (iv) higher...

We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms,but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms.A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) orcorruption (moral hazard)....

In the next 10 years or so, the infrastructure sector has the potential to generate significant employment. This paper estimates annual job creation of about 2.0 million in direct jobs and 2.5 million in direct, indirect and induced infrastructure-related jobs just by meeting the infrastructure...

Cette contribution propose un modèle théorique permettant d?identifier les tendances générales dans le mouvement des électeurs volatiles. Notre méthode permet à partir de données décentralisées de compléter les enquêtes d?opinions pour comprendre quelle part du résultat d?un parti...