bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but … attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …

commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects. …

responsiveness to disagreement payoffs reaches the predicted level. Our results imply that even when real–life bargaining position is …Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent … predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results have come from experiments with bargaining power allocated …

We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information …

We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant …

We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral …

bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique …