This paper studies an environment in which workers accumulate information about employment contacts made while searching on-the-job. Workers use this search capital to improve wages and insure against job destruction. This behaviour generates voluntary and involuntary job-to-job transitions with...

This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers, in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding, have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for...

We construct a simple equilibrium search model in which workers accumulate information about previously met employment contacts. We term the latter search capital. Here search capital (partially) insures workers against adverse shocks. The model provides a theory of job-to-job transitions that...

This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...

This paper constructs and quantitatively assesses an equilibrium search model with on-the- job search and general human capital accumulation. In the model workers differ in their innate abilities and firms in their productivities. Wages are dispersed because of search frictions and...

We build an analytically and computationally tractable stochastic equilibrium model of unemployment in heterogeneous labor markets. Facing search frictions within markets and reallocation frictions between markets, workers endogenously separate from employment and endogenously reallocate between...

The objective of this paper is to study why are some workers paid more than others. To do so we construct and quantitatively assess an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search, general human capital accumulation and two sided heterogeneity. In the model workers differ in abilities and...

We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different ability, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently...

Using quarterly data for the U.K. from 1993 through 2012, we document that in economic downturns a smaller fraction of unemployed workers, when starting a new job, start it in a new occupation or industry (a career change, in the parlance of this paper). Moreover, the proportion of total hires...