This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable...

Restrictions on transaction price changes are a feature of many security markets. This paper analyzes the impact of such price continuity rules on price dynamics and examines possible rationales for their existence. Contrary to popular belief, continuity rules need not reduce price efficiency,...

We examine the proposition chat competitive firms must behave as if they were maximizing profits; otherwise they would go bankrupt, or even fail to be financed in a competitive capital market. We investigate a model in which an entrepreneur raises funds for a risky enterprise on a competitive...

This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze market makers' intertemporal pricing strategies. We show that dealers who adopt non-cooperative pricing strategies may set bid-ask spreads above competitive levels. This form of quot;implicit collusionquot; differs from explicit collusion,...

We study the relationship between rationality and economic survival in a simple dynamic model, where agents from different populations interact repeatedly through random matching. An explicit criterion (quot;bankruptcyquot;) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are...