Traditional power indices are not suited to take account of explicit preferences, strategic interaction, and particular decision procedures. This paper studies a new way to measure decision power, based on fully specified spatial preferences and strategic interaction in an explicit voting game...

This article replies to the claim that preference-based power indices are impossible and that preferences should be ignored when assessing actors’ influence in different interactions (Braham and Holler [2005] ‘The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index’, Journal of...

Power indices like those of Shapley and Shubik (1954) or Banzhaf (1965) measure the distribution of power in simple games. This paper points at a deficiency shared by all established indices: players who are inferior in the sense of having to accept (almost) no share of the spoils in return for...

The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal...

This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the Conciliation Committee with the aim of evaluating both institutions' power in the European Union's codecision procedure. In contrast to other studies, which use power indices or simple...