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Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

Cuñat, Vicente; Gine, Mireia; Guadalupe, Maria - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111093

Acquisition Premiums of Executive Compensation in China: a Matching View

Kang, Lili; Peng, Fei - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

executive management positions as well as higher growth of executive compensation from aggressive acquisition than board …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114244

Who posts performance bonds and why?: evidence from China's CEOs

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

Despite their theoretical value in tackling principal–agent problems at low cost to firms there is almost no empirical literature on the prevalence and correlates of performance bonds posted by corporate executives. We show that they are an important feature in today's CEO labour market in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126044

Say pays! Shareholder voice and firm performance

Cuñat, Vicente; Giné, Mireia; Guadalupe, Maria - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071266

Who posts performance bonds and why? Evidence from China's CEOs

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - In: China Economic Review 30 (2014) C, pp. 520-529

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931675

CEO Bonding: Who Posts Performance Bonds and Why?

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2012

Despite their theoretical value in tackling principal-agent problems at low cost to firms there is almost no empirical literature on the prevalence and correlates of performance bonds posted by corporate executives. Using data for China we examine their incidence and test propositions from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535360

What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy

Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012

All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536

The CEO Labour Market in China's Public Listed Companies

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2012

and rewarded their executives over a decade of huge growth and turbulence. CEO pay is sensitive to firm performance …). CEO pay rises with firm size and growth, with elasticities resembling those for the United States. We find no dramatic … contributed to growth in executive compensation. A picture emerges of an executive labour market in which firms are linking pay to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010551657

CEO Incentive Contracts in China: Why Does City Location Matter?

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2013

CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610739

What Do We Know About China's CEO's? Evidence from Across the Whole Economy

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700445