We analyze competition between workers in a gift-exchange experiment where two workers are hired by the same employer. In the competition treatment the two employees simultaneously choose their effort whereas in the baseline treatment competition cannot occur since there is only one employee per...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker׳s payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

Im Jahr 2010 wurde eine Reform des Finanzierungsmodells für den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk beschlossen. Mit Wirkung zum 01.01.2013 trat der Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag (RBStV) in Kraft, der die bisherige geräteabhängige Rundfunkgebühr durch einen geräteunabhängigen Beitrag ersetzt....

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...

We elicit the willingness to sell personal data (contact information, Facebook details, preferences) in laboratory experiments, using a BDM and take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our experiments are novel in that (i) the experiments are incentivized, (ii) the focus on privacy issues is salient, and...

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...

Although a number of theoretical studies explain empirical puzzles in finance with ambiguity aversion, it is not a given that individual ambiguity attitudes survive in markets. In fact, despite ample evidence of ambiguity aversion in individual decision making, most studies find no or only...

We experimentally analyze the relation of risk preferences and subjects aversion to advantageous inequality as measured by the guilt parameter of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. Our findings reveal a significant negative correlation between subjects risk attitudes and their altruistic...

In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and...