Consumers increasingly prefer to bundle their purchases into a single shopping trip, inducing complementaries between initially independent or substitutable goods. Taking this one-stop shopping behavior into account, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism...

We explore the strategic role of private quality standards in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric retailers that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of producers and endogenizing the suppliers' delivery choice, we show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the...

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms' fixed costs...

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms'fixed costs when...

Als wesentlicher Intermediär zwischen Konsumgüterindustrie und Verbrauchern entscheidet der Einzelhandel mit seiner Sortimentsgestaltung über den Marktzugang von Konsumgütern. Damit verfügt der Einzelhandel über eine Flaschenhalsfunktion, die ihm zentrale Marktmacht gegenüber seinen...

This paper explores how the initial farm size structure affects the exit decision of farms inducing free land capacities, and the allocation of the newly available land resources to the remaining farms in a particular region. We model an agricultural market where large and small firms first...

This paper highlights the strategic role retailers private quality standards play in food supply chains. Considering two symmetric downstream firms that are exclusively supplied by a finite number of upstream firms and letting the upstream firms decide which retailer to supply, we show that...