In this paper we incorporate tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy as an alternative policy scheme. In particular, we develop an international oligopoly model, where governments issue non-cooperatively a number of permits and then allow their trading by their polluting...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting frms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their .rm, however,...

Governments use environmental policies, such as an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to firms, however, governments are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand and the cost of abatement. Our results suggest that not only the...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We construct a model of strategic environmental policy with flexible regulation in an international duopoly context. Firms can affect future environmental regulation through a prior investment in abatement. We demonstrate that the strategic use of environmental policy leads to lower welfare and...

We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two firms compete à la Cournot in a third market under the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced, a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary...

Using a model of dynamic price competition, this paper provides an explanation from the supply side for the well-established observation that retail prices adjust faster when input costs rise than when they fall. The opportunity of profitable storing for the next period induces competitive firms...

We study (energy) markets with dirty incumbents and costly entry by clean producers. For intermediate entry costs, the market outcome exhibits inefficient production and inefficient entry. A policy mix of three popular regulatory instruments—taxation on polluters, feed-in tariffs for clean...