Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which may explain the prevalence of cooperation … implementation occur. It has thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, reputation assessments must be … observed provides ample possibilities for stable cooperation to emerge even under substantial rates of implementation errors. …

its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the … environment and its rival’s output. We show how profit and cooperation rates are affected by the sizes of both firms, their … willingness to cooperate, and by environmental complexity. In addition, we investigate equilibrium firm size and cooperation rates. …

prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how a firm …'s profit and cooperation rates are affected by its size, its rival's size and willingness to cooperate and environmental …

We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy … version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no … cooperative equilibria exist, but not when cooperation is an equilibrium. Furthermore, none of the commonly observed strategies …

behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable. …

its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the … environment and its rival’s output. We show how profit and cooperation rates are affected by the sizes of both firms, their … willingness to cooperate, and by environmental complexity. In addition, we investigate equilibrium firm size and cooperation rates. …

prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how a firm …'s profit and cooperation rates are affected by its size, its rival's size and willingness to cooperate and environmental …