In this paper we analyze the relation between an investor’s experience and the intensity of monitoring activities. Specifically, we consider venture capitalist firms and their choices of time intervals between financing rounds. We hypothesize that more industry investment experience leads to...

In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that...

Non-monotone incentive structures, which - according to theory - are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled...

In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non-monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non-monotonicity of the...

In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non - monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non - monotonicity of the...