We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

We study a two-stage sequential search model with two agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities are private information and they are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage the designer chooses an...

We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive...

We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider “close to uniform” distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price...

We study asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders. We expand the results of Fibich et al. (2002) for asymmetric first-price auctions to a general utility function. We show that for low type bidders, the equality of equilibrium bids with symmetric, uniform distribution bids holds for the...

We compare the seller's expected revenue in asymmetric second-price auctions with the benchmark case where all bidders have the average distribution. We show that with two bidders, asymmetry has a negative effect on revenue. However, for n 2 bidders there is no clear observation we can make. We...

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable,...

We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, two-player common-value Tullock contests in which one of the players has an information advantage have a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium both players exert...