This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

The paper provides an explanation for altruistic behavior based on the matching and learning technology in the population. In a infinite structured population, in which individuals meet and interact with their neighbors, individuals learn by imitating their more successful neighbors. We ask...

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for...

A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Inter- action neighborhood to obtain their payof. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neigh- bors in another neighborhood- the Propagation...

This note describes the effects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments offering identical prizes to a given share of the ranked contestants. This compensation scheme is thought to resemble the selection processes in different areas of the public administration, particularly in...

In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population.