This report argues in favour of an economics-based approach to Article 82, in a way similar to the reform of Article 81 and merger control. In particular, we support an effects-based rather than a form-based approach to competition policy. Such an approach focuses on the presence of...

This report argues in favour of an economics-based approach to Article 82, in a way similar to the reform of Article 81 and merger control.

We address how lending market competition, measured by banks' bargaining power, affects the agency costs of debt finance. We show that the threshold for obtaining loan finance is independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. Moreover, intensified lending market competition leads...

We address the question of how lending market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt finance. It is shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards...

We study the relationship between market structure and risk-taking in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition will reduce lending rates and increase credit market fragility regardless of whether borrowers have access to investment projects displaying first-order or second-order...

We model the interaction between the concentration of the banking sector and the investment strategies of imperfectly competitive firms in the product market to address the question of whether competition makes loan markets more fragile. It is shown how a merger between two banks would typically...

We demonstrate how endogenous information acquisition in venture capital markets creates investment cycles when competing financiers undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way, thereby highlighting the role of intertemporal screening externalities induced by competition among...