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Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment

Mitusch, Kay; Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

conflict of interest is positive but not too high. The value of mediation depends non-monotonically on the degree of conflict …We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when a principal needs information from an … mediator than through the agent himself. This implies that mediation is strictly helpful if and only if the likelihood of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739705

Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper characterizes the optimal insurance contract in an environment where an informed agent can misrepresent the …), the optimal contract is such that higher losses are over-compensated while lower losses are on average under …-compensated. The amount by which higher losses are over-compensated decreases as the loss increases. The optimal contract may then be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101113

Mediated Audits

Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science

design of separating auditing from contracting. The analysis sheds new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting … each reported type the mediator randomizes over a base-contract and the audit contract, which is accompanied by a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268449

Mediated Audits

Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199119

Dynamic Optimal Non-linear Taxation Under Non-commitment

Tsyvinski, Aleh; Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

This paper studies dynamic non-linear taxation in a two-period model without government commitment and a continuum of agents with privately known skill parameters, which are constant overtime. The government is utilitarian but cannot commit at t=1 to the tax scheme that she will propose at t=2....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085448

On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard

Piaser, Gwenaël - Luxembourg School of Finance, Faculté de droit, … - 2007

In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 2000) could have been characterized by direct mechanisms even if the Revelation Principle does not apply in their setting. The use of more sophisticated mechanisms, such as menus, was not necessary.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005404520

All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying

Korpela, Ville - Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu, Turun Yliopisto - 2014

We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents rather lie in such a way that they do not get caught. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096879

Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?

Chen, Yu - Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158988

Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?

Chen, Yu - Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010937205

Direct Mechanisms, Menus and Latent Contracts

Piaser, Gwenaël - Luxembourg School of Finance, Faculté de droit, … - 2007

In common agency games, one cannot characterize all equilibria by considering only direct mechanisms. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Peters [Econometrica, 2001] and Martimort and Stole [Econometrica, 2002] identified a class of indirect mechanisms (namely, menus) which are able to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005590039