We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the...

We revisit a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that under global interactions any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions and in the torus...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2×2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in...

In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...

In this paper we investigate the effects of network topologies on asset price dynamics. We introduce network communications into a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs. The agents may switch between several belief types according to their performance. The performance information...

We report the results of an experiment that examines play in a 50 periods repetition of a two-player coordination game (Stag Hunt game), which admits two pure strategy Nash equilibria that are Pareto-ranked : a payoff-dominant equilibrium and a risk-dominant equilibrium. We consider a 2x3...