In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific...

This paper shows that there does not exist a social choice function that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency and equal treatment of equals simultaneously, in classical exchange economies. This result establishes the incompatibility of fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof social...

Recently the Government of India used procurement auction mechanisms with endogenously determined minimum quality. We find these auctions have no equilibrium in continuous symmetric monotonic pure strategies. This may substantiate the use of auction mechanisms with exogenously determined minimum...

This paper defines the single-crossing property for two-agent, two-good exchange economies for classical (i.e., continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex) individual preferences. Within this framework and on a rich single-crossing domain, the paper characterizes the family of...

The 1982-1983 Bangladesh nutritional blindness study visited 11,618 rural households and examined 18,660 preschool-age children in an effort to determine the prevalence and determinants of eye lesions and loss of sight due to vitamin A deficiency (xerophthalmia). Risk of xerophthalmia was...

Exchange anisotropy refers to the effect that an antiferromagnetic (AF) layer grown in contact with a ferromagnetic (FM) layer has on the magnetic response of the FM layer. The most notable changes in the FM hysteresis loop due to the surface exchange coupling are a coercivity enhanced over...

In this note we develop a family of test statistics for testing exponentiality against NBUE alternatives. The asymptotic distribution of the test statistics is derived. The test statistics are shown to be asymptotically normal and consistent. This family of test statistics includes the test...

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their...