The European Union will be introducing a Europe-wide patent, the so-called Community Patent. Its aim is to foster innovative activity, but strategic effects between firms competing in Ramp;D have not been considered in the official discourse. We show that, even if these are taken into account,...

In antitrust cases as well as for regulated industries, the question of how to treat indirect constraint and captive sales correctly has become of major importance in Europe. The (im-)proper treatment of indirect constraints has lead the CFI to overturn the Commission's decision in the proposed...

We analyze the short- and long-run implications of third-degree price discrimination in input markets where downstream firms differ in their efficiency. In contrast to the extant literature, where the supplier is typically an unconstrained monopolist, in our model input prices are constrained by...

type="main" <p>We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive...</p>

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Universal service objectives are pervasive in telecommunications, and have gained new relevance after liberalization and the introduction of competition in many markets. Despite their policy relevance, little work has been done allowing for a thorough discussion of instruments designed to...

We consider competition in nonlinear tariffs when consumers mix two goods, and ask whether simple two-part tariffs or exclusivity can arise in equilibrium. Contrary to the existing literature, this happens only when consumer types are observable. If they are unobservable, then the equilibrium...

We consider a media market where consumers mix content offered by different firms and firms charge two-part tariffs. As compared to pure linear pricing (pay-per-view), firms make higher profits, while consumers are worse off and the allocation is not first-best. We also consider flat...