We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In...

In the problems of choosing "aspirations" for coalitional games, we study two axioms, "MW-consistency" and "converse MW-consistency",introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1994). We mainly consider two domains: thedomain of all NTU games and the domain of all TU games. In particular, westudy which...

A stationary variant of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which the game frontier is a parallelogram is analyzed. By using the probabilistic cheap talk concept of [3], the discount factor becomes fungible, and for a critical value of the discount factor a unique Pareto-optimal and...

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash [Nash, J.F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162]. On our extended domain, we...