Migration raises a potential free rider problem for the provision of durable local public goods if the late-comers can enjoy the public good without paying for it. Allowing communities to finance public goods by debt mitigates this problem, since future immigrants have to share the burden of the...

This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers and one dislikes entry. Unlike the entrant both incumbents know market demand. One would like to signal high demand, the other low. In separating equilibria incumbents choose full information Nash-equilibrium...

We show that the fact that farmers in a cooperative individually decide how much to supply to cooperative may serve as a commitment device for credibility (and profitably) gaining market share in competition with a profit maximizing firm.

An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently...