We explore both theoretically and experimentally how final prices and security holdings in an asset market influence and forecast behavior and outcomes in an affiliated coordination game. We vary the incentives from the market relative to payoffs from the game, the number of players in a group,...

We explore both theoretically and experimentally how final prices and security holdings in an asset market influence and forecast behavior and outcomes in an affiliated coordination game. We vary the incentives from the market relative to payoffs from the game, the number of players in a group,...

We study the relationship between economic activity, modeled by a minimum-effort coordination game, and asset markets in which securities' values correspond to outcomes of the activity. We explore both theoretically and experimentally how final prices and asset holdings in the market influence...

We explore the behavior of losers of promotional tournaments after the tournament is concluded. We do so through the use of an experiment in which we vary the design of the promotion tournament to determine how tournament design affects effort. We provide a theoretical model demonstrating two...

We explore the behavior of losers of promotion tournaments after the tournament is concluded. We do so through the use of an experiment in which we vary the design of the promotion tournament to determine how tournament design affects post tournament effort. We provide a theoretical model...

Evidence presented in Salmon (2001; Econometrica 69(6) 1597) indicates that typical tests to identify learning behavior in experiments involving normal form games possess little power to reject incorrect models. This paper begins by presenting results from an experiment designed to gather...