This paper develops axiomatically a revealed preference theory of reference-dependent choice behavior. Instead of taking the reference for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem, we suitably relax the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference to obtain, endogenously, the...

Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2011</CitationRef>) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them. Copyright Springer...</citationref>

<Para ID="Par1">Recently, there has been some interest on models of incomplete preferences under uncertainty that allow for incompleteness due the multiplicity of tastes and beliefs. In particular, Galaabaatar and Karni (Econometrica 81(1):255–284, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2013</CitationRef>) work with a strict partial order and present...</citationref></para>

Decision makers have a strong tendency to retain the current state of affairs. This well-documented phenomenon is termed status quo bias. We present the probabilistic dominance approach to status quo bias: an alternative is considered acceptable to replace the status quo only if the chances of a...

This paper axiomatizes models of second-order ambiguous beliefs in the original domain of preferences of Anscombe and Aumann (Ann Math Stat 34:199–205, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1963</CitationRef>) by weakening the first-stage independence postulate. The models we propose include the second-order subjective expected utility (SOSEU)...</citationref>

Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) show that preferences over menus of lotteries can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We provide foundations for Bayesian updating in such a setup. When the subjective state space is finite, we show that Bayesian updating...

This paper suggests an alternative axiomatization of two canonical models of ambiguity aversion. Instead of relaxing the independence axiom to accommodate uncertainty aversion, we impose independence on constant acts only. Maxmin and variational preferences are characterized by different...

This paper characterizes models of ambiguous beliefs in the absence of the completeness axiom. We axiomatize multiple-selves versions of some of the most important examples of complete and ambiguity averse preferences, and characterize when those incomplete preferences are ambiguity averse.