We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …

price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to …

through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the …

further bene.t from combining worker compensation via a bonus-pool contract and relative performance evaluation. Such …

further benefit from combining worker compensation via a bonus-pool contract and relative performance evaluation. Such …

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best …

(sunk costs), different access to information (asymmetric information), cooperation or rivalry, possibility of opportunistic … Pareto sub optimal solution in case of lack of cooperation between both sides. Concentration on lignite price can lead to …