The literature on both theoretical and empirical dynamics requires agents to solve complex dynamic programs, which assumes implicitly that agents are fully rational and have the most accurate expectations given their information set. We claim that this assumption is easily testable provided that...

The assumption that consumers are fully rational and hold correct expectations over prices is demanding in dynamic settings. We claim that it is testable provided that market-level data on prices and purchases are available. We find that consumers hold simple expectations on the timing of...

Many countries have reformed hospital reimbursement policies to provide stronger incentives for quality and cost reduction. The purpose of this work is to show how the effect of such reforms depends on the intensity of local competition. We build a nonprice competition model to examine the...

Yield management has become a standard tool in several industries to increase the profits of firms facing demand uncertainty or consumers heterogeneity. But this technique also raises econometric problems in the estimation of demand models. Quantity-based management, in particular, is the source...

Once individual unobserved heterogeneity and human capital depreci- ation have proved not to fully account for wage di erences consecutive to parenthood, a remaining explanation (discrimination aside) could be that parents select into low wage rms. This paper tests that hypothesis by resorting...

In infinite horizon, a credible durable-good monopolist may resort to intertemporal price discrimination. We provide an analytical characterization of his optimal price policy when consumers and the monopolist have different values for the trade because of distinct discount factors.

Many countries have reformed hospital reimbursement policies to provide stronger incentives for quality and cost reduction. The purpose of this work is to understand how the effect of such reforms depends on the intensity of local competition. We build a nonprice competition model to examine the...

We examine optimal selling mechanisms with ex-ante commitment for a nondurable good when the seller does not observe the times at which strategic consumers arrive on the market and how much they are willing to pay for the good. Assuming consumer risk neutrality, we demonstrate in this...

Quite often, a firm has to decide between investing in a safe project (``small'') where rewards and losses remain moderate and a risky alternative (``big'') where the rewards and the losses are larger. We study such a choice in a context where the probability of success depends both on the...