We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around...

The economic value of the Say-On-Pay (SOP) provision of the Dodd–Frank Act has been a subject of debate. Proponents of this provision suggest these votes benefit shareholders by increasing investor influence over managerial compensation. Opponents of the SOP provision believe compensation...

This paper examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive...

We study the stock market's reaction to the unexpected death of a top executive or board chair for insight into grey director incentives. Whereas there is little debate as to the motives of inside and strict outside directors, the allegiance of grey directors is less certain. We find that grey...

We examine board quality and executive replacement decisions around deaths of senior executives. Stock price reactions to executive deaths are positively related to board independence. Controlling for such factors as the deceased's stockholdings, outside blockholdings, board size, and whether...

We examine abnormal returns around the announcement of antitakeover amendment proposals for evidence on variation in the effectiveness of monitoring by outside stockholders. The evidence suggests that the market views large stockholders who are outsiders but have potential business ties to a...