Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor’s presence may induce institutional change....

Steffen Kallbekken and Torben K. Mideksa explain why economic analysis may demand sharp emissions reductions today rather than the gradual path recommended by Sheila Olmstead and Robert Stavins.

This paper investigates the impact of skilled immigrants on the welfare the host natives. By employing the idea of induced technical change, and the skilled wage premium, this paper tries to link skilled immigration with observed rise in college enrolment, rise in skilled wages, and further...

A previous result by Kemnitz (2001) based on AK type endogenous growth model implied that the gains from immigration depends up on the percapita possession of capital stock by immigrant relative to that of the natives’. However, such a framework ignores the incentive labor creates for...

Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation,...

This paper explores how a principal with time-inconsistent preferences invests optimally in technology or capital. If the current principal prefers her future self to save more, she can increase current investments complementary to future savings and decrease investments in the strategic...

Bård Harstad received the 2013 Erik Kempe Award for his novel and insightful contribution to the study of international environmental policy in his paper “Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy". In a short video, he explains to Re3 the logics behind his theory, and possibly...

We develop a dynamic game to explore the interaction between regulation and private policies, such as self-regulation by firms and activism. Without a public regulator, the possibility of self-regulation is bad for the firm, but good for activists who are willing to maintain a costly boycott to...

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the hold-up problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer...