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We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005551247
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007630692
This paper examines the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012784824
This paper reviews the Israeli credit card industry and discusses in detail the ongoing attempts by the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) to promote competition in the industry. Currently, these attempts had only limited success: there is still little competition both on the issuing and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785083
This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. When firms are identical, only multilateral partial cross ownership (PCO) facilitates tacit collusion; the incentives of firms to collude in this case depend in a comlex way on the whole...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063700
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005261720
This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. In general, the incentives of firms to collude depend in a complex way on the whole set of partial cross ownership (PCO) in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012727965
This paper reviews the Israeli credit card industry and discusses in detail the ongoing attempts by the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) to promote competition in the industry. Currently, these attempts had only limited success: there is still little competition both on the issuing and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772194
An injurer’s activity often exposes multiple potential victims to the risk of harm. We show that under negligence—the tort system’s dominant regime—such victims face a collective-action problem in choosing their activity levels. An increase in one victim’s activity level confers a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652457
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006969880