We study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed. In contrast with the case of private values (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987), in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal, there exists a wide class of...

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson...

We study the role of expectations when agents have a preference for segregation and households face moving frictions. In a fixed environment, there are multiple equilibria: agents' expectations determine whether an ethnic transition occurs. However, the outcome is unique if there is a...

Public projects typically generate both monetary revenue and social benefits that cannot be monetized. We show that a government concerned with the credit rating of its debt should put different discount rates on these two aspects. The credit rating reflects the probability of default on the...