We consider how the political system of the state evolves in the process of economic development. We present a dynamic public goods economy with non-overlapping generations, which confronts the free-rider problem without the state. In each generation, individuals enter under the unanimous rule a...

We investigate international negotiations on CO2 emissions reduction in the Kyoto Protocal by non-cooperative multilateral bargaining theory. The negotiation model has two phases, (i) allocating emission reductions to countries and (ii) international emissions trading. Anticipating the...

Game theory presents a useful analytical tool for addressing the problem of international cooperation and the formation of institutions. We first examine four problems that must be solved to achieve international cooperation: the common knowledge problem, agreement problem, compliance problem,...

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-personcoalitionformation game with an ultimatumbargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range...

This paper reports the results of a cross-country comparison between Austria andJapan for an experimental 3-personcoalition formation ultimatum game. The experimental design allows thecomparison with respect to three decisions. (i)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and...

Based on recent developments in non-cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. The first part presents basic results of the random-proposer model and applies them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labor market....