We show that the presence of a strategic tax policy increases the incentive for a horizontal merger compared to the situation with no tax policy. Thus, we point towards a new factor, viz., strategic tax policy, for increasing the incentive for a horizontal merger that has been ignored in the...

It is usually believed that the presence of a labour union makes firms as well as consumers worse off by increasing wages compared to the situation with no labour union. We show that the presence of a labour union may increase the incentive for entry and may also make consumers better off...

This paper examines the effects of obtaining a strategic advantage of becoming the leader in the market on insiders’ incentives to merge and consumer welfare. We show that being the market leader is privately profitable for the merging insiders. We also show that the leading merger would...

This paper investigates the impacts of competition structures on firms’ incentives for adopting strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certified by a Non-Governmental Organization. We show that, to induce firms to adopt certified ECSR, the certifier will set a standard...

This note investigates the effects of environmental regulation in a general-equilibrium model incorporating capital mobility and sector-specific unemployment. The government sets a maximum allowable level of environmental use in advance. This environmental use beneficially affects the...

Formulates a model for monopolists which incorporates incentives to reduce tax liability by under-reporting profits through overstatement of production costs.

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the...

This paper firstly shows that in a vertically related industry with either domestic upstream monopolist or foreign upstream monopolist, when the upstream firm adopts uniform input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff is higher than the maximum-revenue tariff, if the number of foreign competitors...