Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that style investing generates (a) comovement between individual assets and their styles, and (b) momentum and reversals in both style and asset returns. These predictions imply that one can use comovement to assess the impact of style investing on asset-level...

We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower...

We find lending by state controlled banks to be significantly more associated with monetary policy than is lending by private sector banks. At the country-level, we further find monetary policy to be significantly closely linked to aggregate loan growth and aggregate fixed capital investment...

We analyze financial contracting when the specificity of investments is endogenous. Specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets, but it also improves a firm's long term productivity. While the first effect is known to make financing more difficult, we show that the second effect can...

Evidence indicates that private equity funds, unlike mutual funds, deliver persistent abnormal returns and that top performing funds are often oversubscribed. Why do private equity funds appear to leave money on the table, rather than, say, increasing fund size and/or fees? We argue that private...

We analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous. Specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets, but improves the asset's long-term productivity. While the former is known to make financing more difficult, we show that the latter can ease...

We analyze the nature of financial contracting when an entrepreneur can choose the specificity of investments and financial contracts are incomplete. Investing in project specific assets increases productivity but decreases liquidation value. This creates a strategic incentive to specialize...

Investor protection matters for the cost of equity because it affects the redistribution of wealth from investors to other agents in the economy. This wealth redistribution shifts systematic risk to investors, which can not be eliminated by portfolio diversification or risk sharing through...

Successful private equity managers have funds that are often oversubscribed and provide persistent abnormal returns. Why don't successful managers increase fund size or fees? We argue that managers want to attract high quality entrepreneurs, while entrepreneurs want to match with high ability...