We derive a closed-form solution for the price of a European call option in the presence of ambiguity about the stochastic process that determines the variance of the underlying asset's return. The option pricing formula of Heston (1993) is a particular case of ours, corresponding to the case in...

Literature on dynamic portfolio choice has been finding that volatility risk has low impact on portfolio choice. For example, using long-run U.S. data, Chacko and Viceira (2005) found that intertemporal hedging demand (required by investors for protection against adverse changes in volatility)...

We consider a version of the intertemporal general equilibrium model of Cox et al. (Econometrica 53:363–384, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">1985</CitationRef>) with a single production process and two correlated state variables. It is assumed that only one of them, Y <Subscript>2</Subscript>, has shocks correlated with those of the economy’s output rate...</subscript></citationref>

We derive a closed-form solution for the price of a European call option in the presence of ambiguity about the stochastic process that determines the variance of the underlying asset’s return. The option pricing formula of Heston (Rev Financ Stud 6(2):327–343, <CitationRef CitationID="CR43">1993</CitationRef>) is a particular case of...</citationref>

We develop a model that is a synthesis of the two-sided markets duopoly model of Armstrong (2006) with the nested vertical and horizontal dierentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which consists of a linear city with dierent consumer densities on the left and on the right side of the...

We propose a profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements. This rule is such that the critical discount factor is the same for all the firms. If a cartel applies this rule, then asymmetries among firms may not hinder collusion (contrarily to the typical finding in the...

This paper proposes a general framework to study the sustainability of collusion in markets where demand growth (although deterministic) is not restricted to occur at a constant rate and may trigger future entry. It is shown that, typically, entry occurs later along the collusive path than along...

We study competition between two shopping centers (department stores or shopping malls) located at the extremes of a linear city. In contrast with the existing literature, we do not restrict consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. We obtain this condition as an equilibrium...

We study sustainability of collusion with optimal penal codes, in markets where demand growth may trigger the entry of a new firm. In contrast with grim trigger strategies, optimal penal codes make collusion easier to sustain before entry than after. We compare different reactions of the...

We study optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire-building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information but actual cost (difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of multidimensional...