Showing 1 - 10 of 303
This paper proposes a class of independence axioms for simple acts. By introducing the E-cominimum independence axiom that is stronger than the comonotonic independence axiom but weaker than the independence axiom, we provide a new axiomatization theorem of simple acts within the framework of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696227
This paper proposes a class of independence axioms for simple acts. By introducing the <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${\mathcal {E}}$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="script">E</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-cominimum independence axiom that is stronger than the comonotonic independence axiom but weaker than the independence axiom, we provide a new axiomatization theorem of simple acts...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154912
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we generalize Kajii et al. (J Math Econ 43:218–230, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2007</CitationRef>) and provide a condition under which for a game <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$v$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>v</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, its Möbius inverse is equal to zero within the framework of the <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$k$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>k</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-modularity of <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$v$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>v</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> for <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$k \ge 2$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>k</mi>...</mo></mrow></math></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999747
The objective of this study is to design a laboratory experiment to explore the effect of ambiguity on a subject’s search behavior in a finite-horizon sequential search model. In so doing, we employ a strategy to observe the potential trend of reservation points that is usually unobserved. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188644
Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent’s overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929276
This paper studies the effects of Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity, on entrepreneurial choice. By distinguishing between risk and ambiguity, we first show that ambiguity aversion makes it less likely that an individual will become an entrepreneur. It is also shown that an increase in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385915
In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847837
In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950232
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005216626
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009800150