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We find that firms behave remarkably similarly to how their CEOs behave personally when it comes to leverage choices. We start our analysis by compiling a comprehensive sample of home purchases and financings among S&P 1,500 CEOs. Debt financing in a CEO’s most recent home purchase is used as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509442
We find that firms behave remarkably similarly to how their CEOs behave personally when it comes to leverage choices. We start our analysis by compiling a comprehensive sample of home purchases and financings among S&P 1,500 CEOs. Debt financing in a CEO's most recent home purchase is used as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567897
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009816623
We show that familiarity affects the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers. Controlling for fund location, funds overweight stocks from their managers' home states by 12% compared with their peers. In team-managed funds, home-state overweighting is 37% larger than the fund location effect....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010566669
Based on the psychological theory of place attachments, native local managers should be more rooted in their communities than non-locals and should act accordingly. Consistent with this, local managers are 33% less likely to lay of employees than their non-local industry peers following industry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635892
We show that familiarity affects the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers. Controlling for fund location, funds overweight stocks from their managers' home states by 12% compared with their peers. In team-managed funds, home-state overweighting is 37% larger than the fund location effect....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010113931
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009995549
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005376757
This paper estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs), who have control of a firm's votes, while owning only a minority of the cash flow rights. Analyzing a panel of 309 listed Swedish firms during 1991–1997, for which we have complete and detailed data on ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407083