In a framework à la Martin (1993) we introduce a common component in the managers' private information in order to address three related questions: What is the impact of contracts that reward managers on the basis of realized profits on firms' productive and allocative efficiency relative to...

<i> A Note on Adverse Selection in Oligopolistic Markets </i> (di Riccardo Martina, Salvatore Piccolo) - ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets. The note is aimed at characterizing the relationship between competition and market distortions entailed by...

The impact on vertical contracting of a type-dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of contracts controlling both the retail price and the sales level are compared with those...

The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more...

This note explores the impact of reciprocal altruism on the equilibrium outcome of a two-stage oligopoly game with managerial frms. The structure of the classical two-stage oligopoly game with managerial incentives with strategic substitutes (quantity competition) generates a typical...