This round table presents the materials of the discussion on the research of RANEPA on measuring the impact of weak competition, including: a general approach, as well as the peculiarities and the results of evaluations in selected areas (gas, freight rail transportation, construction,...

We consider the relationship between antitrust policy and intellectual property protection under the condition of poorly enforced intellectual property rights protection. Andrey Shastitko & Alexander Kurdin (Moscow Lomonossov State Univ.)

Many antitrust investigations in Russia continue to present a challenge for the assessment of competition policy and international enforcement ratings. On the one hand, many infringement decisions may be interpreted as an indicator of high enforcement efforts in the context of rigid competition...

Certain characteristics of competition policy in Russia still objectively hinder the effectiveness of the leniency program, even after recent changes. (Andrey Shastitko, Bureau of Economic Analysis, & Svetlana Avdasheva, National Research Univ., Higher School of Economics).

Restrictions on contract terms not only generate an excessive administrative burden on market participants but also undermine a successful cooperation between suppliers and retailers. Svetlana Avdasheva & Andrei Shastitko (Higher School of Economics, National Research University (Moscow) &...

This study analyses the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing,...

Type-I and type-II errors effects do matter both from the rules enforcement perspective and vertically upward to rules enactment. The paper support conventional idea about detrimental influence on deterrence of both types of errors. At the same time special role of type-I errors is demonstrated...

The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous...

Are there grounds to believe that Russian law enforcement follows European practices by borrowing the European norm of collective dominance, and adapting it in Russia to deal with its emerging market economy? (Andrey Shastitko, Bureau of Economic Analysis Foundation)

The article considers the influence of informational imperfections on the performance of the Russian financial market. The focus is on the individual savings market, which exhibits inefficiencies, including those associated with the market power of a dominant agent—Sberbank. Reinforcement of...