We run a laboratory experiment that contributes to the finance literature on "return chasing behavior" studying how investors switch between mutual funds driven by past performance of the funds. The subjects in this experiment make discrete choices between several (2, 3 or 4) experimental funds...

This experiment compares the price dynamics and bubble formation in an asset market with a price adjustment rule in three treatments where subjects (1) submit a price forecast only, (2) choose quantity to buy/sell and (3) perform both tasks. We find that bubbles emerge in all these treatments,...

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such...

In this paper we want to analyze the internal divisional structure within an organi-zation in the framework of incomplete contract theory. We use the framework of Aghionand Tirole (1997) and define the managerial control structure as \sequence of search".A key feature of this paper which...

This article provides two application of incomplete contract theory to real life problems. In the privatization of public service sectors, we show that the coexistence of private and public ownership is better than either privatizing all firms or let all of them to stay un-privatized, because...

We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any efficiencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the firms outside the cartel react to this by...

We propose a new methodology of assessing the effects of individual institution's risk on the others and on the system as a whole. We build upon the Conditional Value-at-Risk approach, however, we introduce the explicit Granger causal linkages and we account for possible nonlinearities in the...

Minority games are a stylized description of strategic situations with both coordination and competition. These games are widely studied using either simulations or laboratory experiments. Simulations can show the dynamics of aggregate behavior, but the results of such simulations depend on the...

We study the evolutionary success of a generalised trigger strategy within an asymmetric, n-player Prisoner's Dilemma environment, with application to the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter...