type="main" xml:lang="en" <p>We present evidence of crowding out of intrinsic motivation in real purchasing decisions from a field experiment in a large supermarket chain. We compare three instruments, a label, a subsidy, and a neutral price change, in their ability to induce consumers to switch...</p>

Private provision of public goods can only supplement government provision if individual actions affect the level of the public good. Cap-and-trade schemes reduce the overuse of common resources such as a stable climate or fish stocks by imposing a binding cap on total use by regulated agents....

Are prices or quantities the best regulatory instrument to align private actions with public interests in the presence of externalities? We add another dimension to this ongoing debate by experimentally analyzing the interaction between instrument choice and intrinsic motivation of regulated...

The increase in the level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere in the last centuries, and the subsequent increase in temperature, has been a widely studied area in the last few decades. Climate change has become a key item on the political agenda due to concerns regarding the...

This paper outlines a method of procuring the benefits of deception in experiments without actually deceiving subjects, which should be suitable for many experimental economics environments. This is done by a modification of an already standard design, the Random Lottery incentive system, which...

This paper examines the implications of habit forming hypothesis for welfare theory. both myopic and rational habit forming models are discussed. First, I analyse the main criteria proposed by myopic habit forming models for measuring individual and social welfare. I show that they are...

Does speculative trade reduce mispricing - and help create efficient markets - or drive prices further from fundamentals? We analyse betting exchange trading, on 9,562 U.K. horse races in 2013 and 2014, to find out. Crucially, as each race is run, the fundamental value of bets is unambiguously...

In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose unilaterally whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves...

This paper examines experimentally two common conjectures in the popular literature on financial markets: that they are swayed by emotion and that they behave like a 'crowd'. We find consistent evidence that deviations of prices from fundamental value depend on the emotion of excitement and on...

We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake...