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In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in...
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It is known that if a capacity is convex then the Dempster-Shafer rule for the capacity is equivalent to the maximum likelihood rule for the core of the capacity. This paper shows that the converse is also true that is, a capacity must be convex if these two rules are equivalent.
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This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results...
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This paper presents a general framework to understand the possibility of a purely speculative trade under asymmetric information, where the decision making rule of each trader conforms to the multiple priors model (Gibloa and Schmeidler, 1989): the agents are interested in the minimum of the...
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