According to existing theory, religion thrives when groups overcome the free-rider problem in the production of religious goods. This paper explains, however, that allowing some free-riding is necessary in a dynamic setting. If an individual only contributes when she has high religious capital,...

Many social and economic networks emerge among actors that only partially observe the network when forming network ties. We ask: what types of network architectures form when actors have limited observation, and does limited observation lead to less efficient structures? We report numerous...

Why do legal disputes ever go to trial? Prior research emphasizes the role of mistakes, irrationalities, or asymmetric information because rational litigants with complete or symmetric information should choose pre-trial settlements over the costs and risks of trial. Using a dynamic...

We examine the optimal disruption of dark (covert and illegal) networks. Of central importance is that an interventionist will generally have incomplete information about the dark network's architecture. We derive the optimal disruption strategy in a stylized model of dark network intervention...

A vast literature documents better economic institutions in common law compared with civil law countries. The present paper argues that legal origin alone is insufficient to explain differences in the quality of economic institutions across countries. Rather, it is the interaction between legal...

In this paper, we present two alternative models of trade and unemployment, in which unemployment is generated through a search mechanism. The basic framework of the first model is Ricardian in that the only factor of production is labor and trade is based on relative technological differences....

I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g., arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

The bottleneck model of congestion with endogenous scheduling has become a standard tool of transportation economics. It provides surprising insights about the time pattern of congestion, optimal pricing, and many distinct inefficiencies of unpriced equilibria including wrong departure order...

Previous research suggests that the elasticity of light-duty motor vehicle travel with respect to fuel cost, known as the "rebound effect," is modest in size and probably declined in magnitude between the 1960s and the late 1990s. However, turmoil in energy markets during the early 2000s has...