By using a microsimulation model, we analyze income-tax-reform proposals for Austria. The proposals include compensation for bracket creeping during the last years and a reduction of marginal tax rates, combined with a broader tax base. Moreover, they make the tax regime simpler. They are to be...

Der Beitrag analysiert die Aufkommens-, Beschäftigungs- und Verteilungswirkungen einer Reformalternative zur Entlastung von Arbeitseinkommen und zur Verbesserung der Effizienz des Steuersystems auf der Basis eines Mikrosimulationsmodells. Die Reformalternative beinhaltet einen Ausgleich der...

We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...

Wir untersuchen auf Basis von Daten aus den Arbeitskostenerhebungen 2000 und 2004 und den Verdienststrukturerhebungen 2002 und 2006 (Statistik Austria) die Zusammenhänge zwischen betrieblicher Weiterbildung und Löhnen sowie der Lohnverteilung in österreichischen Unternehmen. Zusätzliche...

We study the impact of social learning on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Naive advice and observation of others' decisions as two forms of social learning trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. We find that subjects who receive advice outperform uninformed...

We study the effects of institutions of conflict management like corporatism, trust, civic norms and group membership on economic growth. By employing Schneider and Wagner’s (Kyklos 54:509–532, <CitationRef CitationID="CR25">2001</CitationRef>) model and data from 1990–2011, we show that corporatism has (still) a positive...</citationref>

We compare the influence of endogenous leadership on group's contributions in a public goods game with an exogenously appointed leader and find that groups with voluntary leaders outperform groups with involuntary leaders. The decision to contribute last does not undermine cooperation.

We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...