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We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986082
We show that a team may favor self-sabotage to influence the principal’s contract decision. Sabotage increases a team member’s bonus and total team effort. If these benefits outweigh the reduction in the success probability, sabotaging the team is rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041830
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699423
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009848476
Mismatches typically arise because of information problems in markets. This paper discusses the possibility of mismatching in partnerships focussing on strategic mismatches that cannot be explained by information problems. It is shown that due to market competition sometimes players can profit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968134
everal empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968389
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons in?uence agents? incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096536
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617907
Summary This paper critiques state-led strategies for land consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. The critique builds on empirical research about the dynamics of land fragmentation and its presumable effects on cropland abandonment in Albania. Research results indicate that cropland...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973716
Summary This essay introduces a collection of papers that examine the effects of contemporary land reforms in practice. This essay focuses on the roles of state and community in land reform. It argues that state-led strategies encounter significant problems on the ground due to their reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973739