The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities {or simply a TU-game. A value function for TU-games is a function that assigns to every game a distribution of the payoffs. A value function...

In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games.This value turns out to have a nice interpretation.We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game.

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities {or simply a TU-game. A value mapping for TU-games is a mapping that assigns to every game a set of vectors each representing a distribution...

A cooperative game with transferable utility -or simply a TU-game- describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation.A value function for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payoffs over the players in the game.An...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU- games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payos change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...