A patent is not a perfect protection against imitation. It only grants the patentholder the right to sue intruders once they have been identified. In order to identify an infringer, a patentholder must first monitor the market, and then react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to...

"Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents" (with Claude Crampes), Les Annales d'Economie et Statistique, 49-50, pp 265-288, 1998. Reprinted in The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation, ed. Encaoua, Hall, Laisney, Mairesse, Kluwer academic publishers, 2000.

We analyze the interaction between a reliable source of electricity production and intermittent sources such as wind or solar power. We first characterize the optimal energy mix, emphasizing the availability of the intermittent source as a major parameter for the optimal investment in capacity....

Thanks to "smart grids", consumers will gradually become active players in electricity markets, especially by voluntarily decreasing their consumption when receiving scarcity messages from the market operator. For a fast and efficient transition to a more dynamic industry, the regulatory and...

This article shows how European courts have managed tensions between antitrust and intellectual protection in three areas: (1) Parallel imports and market segmentation; (2) Refusals to supply essential inputs protected by patents and copyrights; (3) Forms of conduct by copyright collectives.

Ce chapitre est consacré aux aspects microéconomiques de l'innovation. La première partie détaille les mécanismes élémentaires qui poussent les entreprises à innover et les freins à leur effort quand l'appropriation des résultats n'est pas parfaite. La deuxième partie présente la...