I develop an agency model of job assignments where jobs differ based on the breadth of tasks. A tradeoff between task complementarities and relative abilities of workers results in those with balanced skills being assigned to multitask jobs. The same tradeoff between complementarities and...

We examine how banks and financial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to investors. The critical assumption is that financial markets are characterized by limited enforcement of contracts, and in the event of default only a fraction of borrowers' assets can be seized. Limited...

We study a worker's incentives to invest in non-verifiable skills. We do this within the context of recent innovative work practices, where jobs have become more flexible. When jobs are flexible, standard approaches in the literature for firms to credibly reward skills (i.e. committing ex-ante...

Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that among the sampled...

Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we ask how different firm characteristics are associated with the predicted benefits to organizational performance from using team production. To compute the predicted benefits from using team production, we estimate structural...

Using a sample of skilled workers from a cross section of establishments in four metropolitan areas of the U.S., I present evidence suggesting that relative performance of workers determines promotions, supporting the notion of internal promotion competitions in which internal hiring policies...