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This paper provides an in-depth study of the (most) refined best reply correspondence introduced by Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2012). An example demonstrates that this correspondence can be very different from the standard best reply correspondence. In two-player games, however, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010543391
Once relegated to cinema or history lectures, bank runs have become a modern phenomenon that captures the interest of students. We use a simple classroom experiment based upon the Diamond-Dybvig Model (1983) to demonstrate how a bank run, a seemingly irrational event, can occur rationally. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719747
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on an individual's expected utility function under which any zero-mean idiosyncratic risk increases cautiousness (the derivative of the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion), which is the key determinant for this individual's demand for options...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724077
Should lenders be made liable for environmental damages caused by their customers? In a recent paper Pitchford studied the case where the customer is a wealth-constrained manager-owned firm. He argued convincingly that a joint liability of lender and firm may reduce the firm's incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009457979
Should lenders be made liable for environmental damages caused by their customers? In a recent paper Pitchford studied the case where the customer is a wealth-constrained manager-owned firm. He argued convincingly that a joint liability of lender and firm may reduce the firm's incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401270
Kohlberg and Mertens argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition of deletion of an equivalent strategy and not require the use of weakly dominated strategies. In this paper we study which of these requirements are satisfied by Kalai and Samet's concepts of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401322
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following requirements: After every sufficiently small mutation of a population playing a single strategy in the set: a) No single mutant strategy can spread. b) A single mutant strategy not in the set will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401351
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